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Abstract
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The recent nancial crisis as well as some famous accounting scandals have re-
vealed that some rms can deliberately obfuscate their nancial statements, and
that many investors may lack the sophistication needed to read through such
opaqueness. As a result, nancial markets may not be e¢ cient in that stock
prices may be far from the underlying fundamentals. A typical regulatory re-
sponse would be to impose tighter disclosure requirements on rms while at the
same time attempting to "educate" investors, if possible.1 Another kind of re-
sponse may instead rely on market forces, hoping that the competition to attract
investors would discipline rms and lead to market e¢ ciency.
In this paper, we develop a simple framework to investigate the impact of
strategic nancial reporting on whether the prices of stocks correctly reect funda-
mental values. We focus on a setting in which investors are not fully sophisticated
in the way they interpret the information provided by rms, and at the same time
rms are required to meet (strong) regulatory standards insofar that all activities
in the rm have to be referred to in the nancial report. We analyze how rms
reporting strategies and market prices vary as investorsdegrees of sophistication
vary and/or as more rms compete to attract investors.
Specically, we consider a stylized nancial market in which each rm simul-
taneously chooses a nancial report with the objective of inuencing investors
beliefs and ultimately maximizing the trading price on the stock market.2 A re-
port consists in a set of signals about the rms protability (how much investors
can expect to receive for each dollar invested in the rm). We assume that each
rm is constrained to choose a set of signals whose mean corresponds to the true
protability, while at the same time being able to freely a¤ect the noise in the
signalsdistribution.
Such a report can be viewed as a statement about the protability of the
rm. The rm can choose to make a very simple statement, a single number
summarizing the overall protability of the rm, or a more complicated statement,
1Forms of investor protection aimed at enhancing the reliability of nancial reports were
famously advocated by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt (Levitt (1998)), and then incorporated in
the Regulation for Fair Disclosure. Increasing the transparency of corporate disclosures lies at
the heart of recent interventions such as SarbanesOxley Act (adopted after Enron) and Dodd
Frank Reform (adopted after the subprime crisis). The latter has also created the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau with the intent of improving investorssophistication.
2Managerscompensation is directly inuenced by trading prices through stock options say.
Evidence suggests a strong link between performance-related compensation and aggressive ac-
counting practices, see Burns and Kedia (2006); Bergstresser and Philippon (2006); Efendi,
Srivastava and Swanson (2007); Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008).
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a large set of numbers describing the protability of each single activity.3 Under
this metaphor, our key assumption is that rms are able to package activities in
the rm as they wish, but not to hide them. All activities must be reported, and
they cannot be made more or less visible to investors. As a result, the average
reported protability must coincide with the true aggregate protability of the
rm.4
If investors were able to read and process the entire report provided by a given
rm and if, to continue on the packaging metaphor, they had a common under-
standing of how the various activities a¤ect the future protability of the rm, the
way in which activities are packaged would make no di¤erence. Investors would
obtain a common assessment of each rms value and that would coincide with
the true value of the rm. Yet, there is ample evidence that investors tend to
end up with di¤erent beliefs about rmsvalues even when exposed to the same
reports, as illustrated for example by the abnormal trading volumes frequently
observed around earning announcements. Scholars have also noted that disagree-
ment tends to be more pronounced when the nancial reports are more complex.5
Such evidence suggests that either investors base their estimates (at least partly)
on di¤erent pieces of information in the reports or that they interpret this infor-
mation di¤erently.
Motivated by this observation, we assume, in our model, that investors inde-
pendently of each other pay attention to K activities/signals, taken at random,
from the report of each rm, and they assess the value of the rm based on the
average protability observed on these sampled activities. One interpretation is
that investors tend to overextrapolate the value of rms from the possibly small
sample of activities they pay attention to. An alternative interpretation is that
investors hold heterogeneous beliefs as to which activities are more representative
of each rms value (and our model assumes a special form of heterogeneity). The
key implication is that investors may end up with di¤erent valuations of each rm,
3We wish to capture the idea that, in practice, rms have a lot of discretion in the way they
report their performance to investors. Even relatively simple reports, like earnings announce-
ments, are typically supplemented by a large set of information such as balance sheets, cash
ows, and earnings disaggregated at various levels (say by products or geographic regions). The
amount of additional information provided, as well as its format, is largely discretionary (Chen,
DeFond and Park (2002); Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2002)).
4This does not require that the regulator knows the protability of the rm ex-ante but rather
that he may be able to observe it ex-post.
5See e.g. Beaver (1968); Kandel and Pearson (1995); Hong and Stein (2007), and in par-
ticular Bailey, Li, Mao and Zhong (2003); Sarkar and Schwartz (2009); Hope, Thomas and
Winterbotham (2009) on the role of complex information. See also Morgan (2002); Flannery,
Kwan and Nimalendran (2004) for studies in which rmsopacity and investorsdisagreement
appear so closely interrelated that the latter is used as a proxy for the former.
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which is what motivates trade in our setting.
Because the average of what each rm reports is correct, and draws from the
reports of rms are made independently across investors, it follows that investors
estimates are on average correct. One might have thought that as a result no
signicant price distortions should arise. Yet, this intuition is incorrect. Prices
need not reect the average belief across all investors, and, as our analysis will
reveal, for well-chosen distributions, prices can exceed such average beliefs.
We develop our insights in a simple setting in which investors are risk-neutral
and can only trade one stock, either short sell or buy. Hence, they trade the stock
for which they expect the highest gains from trade (that is, the highest di¤erence
between their perceived values of the rms and the corresponding prices).
We rst show that, in a monopolistic setting, the rm can make sure that the
valuation of the marginal investor exceeds the average valuation (typically using
some skewed distribution of returns). We show that the mispricing obtained in
our simple setup carries over to more general specications, as long as investors
demand is not linear in the perceived gains from trade. Moreover, we show that
mispricing can persist even if investors become more sophisticated in the sense
that the sample size on which they base their estimates grows very large.
We then turn to our main question of interest, which concerns the e¤ect of
increasing the number of rms competing for investorstrades. The key observa-
tion is that, in an oligopolistic setting, rms can exploit an additional source of
manipulation. Since each investor only trades a subset of rms, the price of rm
j reects the valuations of those who trade rm j (as opposed to the valuations
of all investors). A well-chosen reporting strategy can distort prices by making
investors who trade rm j be those who are on average more optimistic about j.
To illustrate this most simply, we consider the symmetric equilibrium which
induces the highest stock price. In this equilibrium, the distribution of beliefs
induced by each rm j is positively skewed: a few investors end up with very pos-
itive evaluations and many investors end up with moderately negative evaluations
about j. In this way, when considering which rms to trade, investors tend to
perceive higher gains from trading based on good evaluations than on bad evalua-
tions. Since each investor concentrates on trades perceived as the most protable,
the probability of short selling rm j given a negative assessment about j is much
smaller than the probability of buying rm j given a positive assessment about j.
This is what leads to overpricing. Moreover, the e¤ect is all the more pronounced
when many rms compete for investorstrades. Fixing rmsreports, the proba-
bility of drawing a negative signal from all rms -that is the only case in which
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selling occurs- decreases with the number of rms. In this way, low evaluations are
less likely to be incorporated into prices, which implies that overpricing increases
with the number of rms in the market.6
We perform our main analysis in a stylized model which abstracts from many
(relevant) features of real world nancial markets. In Section 6, we discuss the
robustness of our insights to various modications of this basic setting. We show
that our key results can be derived when investorsdemand depends in a smoother
way on perceived gains from trade and when investors perform some (heuristic)
form of inference from market prices. We also discuss the e¤ects of imposing that
rmsreports must include an aggregate summary of their protability or that
reported values cannot exceed an upper bound, or that the sampling process is
correlated among investors or that some share of investors would be fully rational
or that the fundamental values would be heterogeneous and private information
to rms.
We believe our ndings have some important implications for the study of
manipulation of beliefs and mispricing in nancial markets. An important obser-
vation that comes out from our analysis is that disagreement may lead to over-
pricing even when beliefs are on average correct and there is no asymmetry in
investorsability to buy or sell stocks (in particular, short selling is allowed). In
our model, such an asymmetry arises endogenously as a result of rmsstrategic
choice of nancial report, which makes negative aspects of the report less likely
to a¤ect prices than good aspects.7 Observe that rms are not simply interested
in creating disagreement, as the shape of disagreement matters. In particular,
as explained above, positively skewed distributions of beliefs are key to sustain
overpricing in our oligopolistic setting. We also notice that the skewness increases
with the number of rms competing to attract traders.
From a policy perspective, we think these insights can be informative for the
above mentioned debate on rmstransparency and investorssophistication. In
this respect, we highlight that a form of transparency whereby no activity can be
hidden from the reports does not ensure market e¢ ciency. In our setting, trans-
parency is not about providing more information. In a sense, our rms provide
more information than what is needed to assess their value. In a similar vein,
increasing investorssophistication is not only about increasing how much infor-
6This argument only shows why market clearing may occur at a higher price as we increase
the number of rms. A more complete description of why no rm can unilaterally deviate and
get a higher price, as well as a discussion of other possible equilibria, is left to Section 5.
7This is to be contrasted with the insight in Harrison and Kreps (1978) that the most opti-
mistic trader xes the price, which crucially hinges on the impossibility of short-selling.
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mation they can process.8 While we show that this may reduce mispricing, it need
not eliminate it, as long as investors underestimate the strategic content of rms
reports. Institutions that specialize in deciphering rmsreports, such as rating
agencies, appear useful in this respect. At the same time, however, rating agencies
may increase the degree of correlation in investorsevaluations and, as we observe
in Section 6, that may exacerbate mispricing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection, we
review our approach in relation to the existing literature. In particular, we report
evidence which motivates our interest in overextrapolation in nancial markets
and we discuss alternative models that have dealt with similar motivations. In
Section 2 we present our baseline model. In Section 3 we analyze a market with
a single rm in the simplest sophistication scenario. In Section 4 we study the
e¤ect of sophistication. In Section 5 we study the e¤ect of increasing the number
of rms. Section 6 o¤ers a discussion of the robustness of our results and of the
role of bounded rationality in our setting. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
1.1.1 Overextrapolation
A key aspect of our model is that investors end up with di¤erent beliefs even if
exposed to the same reports, and they are willing to trade based on these beliefs.
Having di¤erent interpretations of the same information can be related to models
of limited attention. Chahrour (2014) considers a rational inattention model in
which when too much information is transmitted by the central bank, investors
end up having di¤erent beliefs because they randomly sample di¤erent aspects of
the information. Our model is however di¤erent in spirit from Chahrour (2014)
and more generally from most of the rational inattention literature started by
Sims (2003). First, it does not view the information acquisition as being opti-
mally determined based on some prior knowledge of the problem.9 Second, and
importantly, our investors are not rational in the sense of making the correct infer-
ence from the signals they get and from market prices. Compared to the rational
8Information overload has been widely discussed across social disciplines, including accounting
(see Eppler and Mengis (2004) for a survey). Its policy implications are heatedly debated. We
refer to Paredes (2003) for an interesting discussion of information overload from a regulatory
perspective.
9See e.g. Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012), K½oszegi and Szeidl (2013), Gabaix (2013)
and Pavan (2014) for alternative behavioral modelling touching on targeted attention, and
Di Maggio and Pagano (2013) for a model of disclosure in which investors have di¤erent abilities
to process complex information.
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inattention literature, our investors have no knowledge about the distribution of
information in the economy and they rely exclusively on the limited set of signals
they pay attention to.
The tendency to overextrapolate from small samples that our modelling of in-
vestorsheuristics assumes is well documented in the psychological literature. It
may reect for example what Tversky and Kahneman (1971) called the "law of
small numbers" whereby "people regard a sample randomly drawn from a popu-
lation as highly representative, that is, similar to the population in all essential
characteristics." Evidence of overextrapolation appears also explicitly in the con-
text of nancial markets. Several surveys show how investorsexpectations are
strongly inuenced by a small sample of past returns (see e.g. Shiller (2000);
Dominitz and Manski (2011); Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)); similar evidence
appears also in studies of actual investment decisions.10
The specic formalization of the heuristic followed by our investors builds on
the sampling heuristic rst studied by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) in a game-
theoretic context and then applied in IO settings by Spiegler (2006a) and Spiegler
(2006b).11 Our model follows the spirit of Spiegler also in the questions that are
being addressed (e¤ect of sophistication, e¤ect of competition), but our application
is di¤erent, leading to di¤erent formulations of the game and di¤erent conclusions.
Alternative models of investorsoverextrapolation have been considered in the
context of nancial markets. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990b)
study in a multi-period setting whether arbitrageurs have a stabilizing role in the
presence of extrapolative investors, while Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998),
Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) focus on how extrapolative investors
react to news. None of these papers studies the issue of strategic nancial report-
ing, which is the main focus of our paper.
10Benartzi (2001) show that employeesinvestment in company stock depends heavily on past
returns (and that is not correlated to future returns); Greenwood and Nagel (2009) document
that inexperienced fund managers contributed to the Internet bubbles by chasing trends; Baquero
and Verbeek (2008) show that money tend to ow from poorly performing hedge funds to funds
with good past performance (and this does not improve future returns). A common feature in
these examples is that agents choose their investment strategy by overextrapolating from the
limited amount of data they observe.
11See also Rubinstein and Spiegler (2008), who consider a speculative market in which investors
randomly sample one price in the history of posted prices and buy if the current price is below
the sampled price.
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1.1.2 Other related work
A few recent papers analyze the formation of stock prices in competitive equilibria
with non-omniscient agents (in Gul, Pesendorfer and Strzalecki (2011), agents can
only distinguish a limited number of contingencies; in Eyster and Piccione (2013)
and Steiner and Stewart (2012), agents rely on coarse reasoning to analyze the
dynamics of the market). An essential distinctive feature of our study is the
focus on how investorsbeliefs may be manipulated, which has no counterpart
in these papers.12 In addition, a growing literature studies nancial markets in
which investors hold heterogeneous beliefs (see Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) and
Hong and Stein (2007) for reviews). Our model seems to be among the rst to
investigate how rms may use nancial reports as a way to inuence investors
disagreement.
There is also a large literature that studies how much information can be
transmitted from an informed sender to an uninformed decision-maker when the
latter is assumed to be perfectly rational. The literature provides various possible
modelling of the disclosure choice of senders. The sender may choose its strategy
after having observed the state (as in models of cheap talk à la Crawford and
Sobel (1982)). Or he can commit to a disclosure policy ex ante (as in Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011), Rayo and Segal (2010) or Jehiel (2011)). Or else he can be
forbidden to lie other than by omission (as in Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981),
Shin (2003)). Some scholars have adapted such models to the study of nancial
markets. For example, Stein (1989) considers a model in which rational investors
correctly anticipate that managers distort earnings and so markets are e¢ cient.
Our approach shares with that literature -in particular the Bayesian persuasion
literature- the desire to endogenize the degree of transparency/opaqueness chosen
here by rms regarding their communication strategy.13 As already mentioned,
however, we do not assume that investors perform rational inferences from the
signals they receive and instead base their decisions on simpler heuristics. In line
with the evidence reported above, this seems a useful complementary approach
for studying complex situations in which investors may lack a complete Bayesian
12In Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2008), subjective beliefs are derived in a setting in which
analysts provide biased recommendations and investors are heterogeneous in their ability to draw
the correct inference from these recommendations. In their setting, however, the objective for
analysts is to appear of good type as opposed to manipulate investorsbeliefs about rms
values.
13In particular, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) identify conditions under which the sender
can benet from communication, typically by using noisy signals where noise is adjusted so as
to induce the best choice of action at minimal cost.
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representation of the environment they are facing. We further elaborate on the
relation with fully rational models in Section 6.
Finally, the strategies of rms in nancial reporting are analyzed in a large
literature in accounting (see e.g. Verrecchia (2001) for a survey, and Hirshleifer and
Teoh (2003) for a model in which investors have limited attention). This literature,
however, generally abstracts from the role of improved investors sophistication
and of market competition on rmsreporting strategies, which is the main focus
of our analysis.
2 Model
Consider a stock market consisting of F rms j = 1; :::F , each having overall
protability ', which we interpret as rmsfundamental value. There is a unitary
mass of investors trading on the stock market. Investors are unaware of the fun-
damental values of the rms. They assess the protability of the various rms by
sampling the protability of some (randomly drawn) activities in the various rms
and extrapolating from the sample. Each investor can only trade one unit of one
stock (either buy or short sell), and he trades the stock for which he perceives the
highest gain from trade. The prices of the various stocks are determined through
market clearing conditions.
Firms are assumed to know the procedure followed by investors, and they seek
to maximize the price of their stocks. Each rm chooses a nancial reporting
strategy that consists in a set of signals representing the returns of the various
activities in the rm. Firms are free to package (or even fabricate) activities as
they wish and we refer to this strategic choice as their nancial report. The mean
of these signals is constrained to coincide with the fundamental value ', which
holds because of regulatory constraints (all activities must appear somewhere).
Moreover, rms are constrained to not report too low returns, and we normalize
the lower bound to zero.
There is complete information among rms, and we consider the Nash equilib-
ria of the nancial reporting game played by the rms. In particular, our analysis
will focus on whether the prices of the stocks di¤er from the fundamental values,
and how the sophistication of investors (see below for a measure of sophistication)
and/or the degree of competitiveness (as measured by the number F of rms)
a¤ect the result.
Formally, the packaging of rm j activities in the nancial report is described
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as a distribution j, whose support Xj satises
Xj  R+; (1)
and whose mean xj satises
xj = '; (2)
for each j = 1; :::; F:14 We denote by  the set of signal distributions satisfying
conditions (1)-(2), and we allow rms to choose any distribution in : In the
sequel, we refer to (2) as the aggregation condition.
Investors do not know the fundamental values of the rms, and they employ
a simple heuristic procedure in order to assess them. For each rm, they consider
K independent random draws from the signal distribution of the rm, and they
interpret the average of these K signals as the fundamental value of the rm.




i;K from rm j; his assessment







We also assume that the draws are independent across investors and rms. Such
a heuristic can easily be interpreted along one of the general principles outlined
in Kahneman (2011): "All there is (for investor i) to assess rm js value is what
investor i sees of rm j," and we implicitly assume here that investor i only sees
xji;n, n = 1; :::; K of rm j, from which x^
j
i is obviously a focal assessment.
15
Based on his assessments of the values of rms, each investor trades one unit
of one stock and he can either buy or short sell it. Hence, investor i is willing
to trade one unit of stock r if stock r is perceived to o¤er the highest gains from
trade. That is, if
r 2 arg max
j
pj   x^ji  ; (3)
where pj denotes the price of stock j. Investor i buys stock r if pr  x^ri and he
short sells stock r if pr  x^ri . Note that arg maxj
pj   x^ji  may sometimes consist
of several stocks r; in which case investor i is indi¤erent between several options. In
14It should be noted that, while for convenience we describe a rms report as a distribution
of signals, there is nothing stochastic in such report. Randomness only arises as a result of
investorssampling procedure.
15That x^ji is focal can possibly be related to a form of coarse reasoning. If one has to form
a guess as to what the mean of a distribution is on the basis of K independent draws from the
distribution, then without further information (meaning by averaging over all possible distrib-
utions) the empirical mean would be the right guess. Such a line of reasoning can be modeled
using Jehiel (2005)s analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
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case of indi¤erence, a tie-breaking rule (to be determined endogenously) species
the probability assigned to the various possible trades.




; j = 1; ::; F: A tie-breaking
rule ! species for each (p; x^i) a probability !r(p; x^i) of demanding (resp. short-
selling) one stock of rm r if pr  x^ri (resp. pr  x^ri ) with the requirement that
!r(p; x^i) 6= 0 only if r 2 arg maxj
pj   x^ji  :
Any given  induces a distribution over x^i. The law of large number guar-
antees that, for nite economies and as the number of investors gets large, the
distribution of x^i across individuals i would get close to  (for any topology if 
is a distribution of nitely many signals and for appropriately chosen topologies
otherwise). Working directly with a continuum of investors, we assume that the
distribution of x^i across individuals i coincide with .16 Formally, given x^i, p,
!, is demand of stock j is dji (x^i, p, !) = !j(p; x^i) if p
j  x^ji and 0 if pj > x^ji .
Similarly, isupply of stock j is sji (x^i, p, !) = !j(p; x^i) if p
j  x^ji and 0 if pj < x^ji .
Thanks to our identication assumption, the aggregate demand and supply can
then be computed according to:
Dj(; p; !) =
Z
dji (x^i; p; !)dx^i;
Sj(; p; !) =
Z
sji (x^i; p; !)dx^i:
As far as rms are concerned, we assume that they are completely rational and
that they know the procedure employed by investors (in particular, they know
K). Given that rm j seeks to maximize pj, this leads to the following denition
of equilibrium (in which  j and p j are the distributions and prices for all rms
except j):
Denition 1 (Equilibrium) The prole (; p; !) is an equilibrium if: for each j,
j 2 ,
a) D(; p; !) = S(; p; !), and
b) There is no distribution ~j 2 ; prices ~pj; ~p j; and tie-breaking rule ~! such that
D(~j;  j; ~pj; ~p j; ~!) = S(~j;  j; ~pj; ~p j; ~!) and ~pj > pj.
Condition (a) requires that the markets clear. Condition (b) requires that
there should be no protable deviation for any rm j; where a protable deviation
16There are well known technical issues associated with the use of the law of large numbers
with a continuum of independent variables (see for example, Judd (1985)). We abstract from
these issues here, even though we conjecture our results hold approximately in nite economies
as the number of investors gets large (for prices nearby those shown in the various propositions
with a probability close to 1).
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~j of rm j means that for the prole of distributions (~j;  j), there exists a
tie-breaking rule ~! and prices ~pj; ~p j that clear the markets which are such that
rm j achieves a strictly higher price ~pj > pj.17
In the following analysis, we will prove the existence of an equilibrium (in a
constructive manner). Discrete distributions with a nite number of signals will
play an important role. We will denote by  = fx1; 1;x2; 2; ::g the distribution
in which x1 is reported with probability 1; x2 is reported with probability 2;
and so on.
3 Monopoly
We rst focus on a monopolistic rm facing investors who just consider one activity
in the nancial report. That is, we set F = 1 and K = 1:
As there is only one rm, the market clearing price corresponds to the median
belief about the rms value. At this price, half of the investors want to buy and
half of them want to sell. Since each investor only trades one unit, the market
clears. Moreover, given that investors only consider one signal, such a median
belief corresponds to the median of the rms distribution. Hence, the monopolys
problem is to choose a distribution with the maximal median that satises the
constraints (1) and (2) that signals should be non-negative and that the mean of
the distribution should coincide with the fundamental '.
Such maximization is achieved with a two-signal distribution that puts weight
on 0 and h and such that the median is just h (requiring that the weight on h
is just above that on 0). To see this, observe that any signal strictly above the
median is a waste for the rm as reducing such a signal to the median while
increasing all signals slightly so as to meet the aggregation condition (2) would be
protable. Similarly, any signal strictly in between 0 and the median is a waste,
as lowering such signals to 0 while increasing all signals slightly so as to respect
(2) would be protable. Consider then  = f0; 1  ;h; g with   1=2. The
aggregation condition (2) implies that h = ', and thus the maximum price that
can be achieved by the monopolist is 2'. The following Proposition collects these
17There are alternative possible denitions of protable deviations (based on other expecta-
tions about the ensuing market clearing prices). Note however that any equilibrium as dened
here would a fortiori be an equilibrium under the alternative specications of protable devia-
tions. None of our results depends on this specic choice.
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observations.18
Proposition 1 Suppose F = 1 and K = 1: The rm chooses the distribution
M = f0; 1=2; 2'; 1=2g : The price is pM = 2':
4 Monopoly and Sophistication
We now turn to a setting in which investors are more sophisticated in the sense
of considering larger samples. More precisely, we consider a monopolist and we
assume that investors sample several (K > 1) signals in order to evaluate the
fundamental value of the rm. Our question of interest is whether the price gets
close to the fundamental if we let K be su¢ ciently large.
Based on the law of large number, one might have expected that, for K large
enough, investors would end up with (approximately) correct assessments of the
fundamental value, and thus the market clearing price would have to be close to
'. Such an intuition would be true if the nancial reporting strategy of the rm
were set independently of K. But, this is not the relevant consideration here,
given that the rm can adjust its nancial reporting strategy to the number of
draws made by investors (since we assume that rms know K before they choose
their reporting strategy). Thus, the distribution chosen by the rm will typically
change with K, and the law of large number need not apply.
In fact, we show that to the extent that K is nite, no matter how large,
the rm can guarantee a price bounded away from the fundamental by a suitable
choice of reporting strategy. By the previous argument, such reporting strategy
must depend on K. Specically, consider the following two-signal distribution:
K =

0; (1=2)1=K ;h(K); 1  (1=2)1=K	 ; (4)
and the price pK = h(K)=K; with h(K) = '=[1   (1=2)1=K ] so that the mean of
the distribution is '.
An investor who gets K draws from the distribution and samples z times the
signal h(K) is willing to buy if the price does not exceeds zh(K)=K. As the
price equals h(K)=K; only those who sample K times signal 0 are willing to sell,
which is a proportion [(1=2)1=K ]K = 1=2 of investors. That is, at this price half of
investors sell and half of the investors buy, so the market clears.
18The tie-breaking rule is the one favoring demand over supply in case of indi¤erence. Ac-
cordingly, when the price is equal to their evaluation, investors are assumed to be buying one
unit of stock.
13
So given K, the monopolist can achieve a price of its stock no smaller than
pK =
'
K[1  (1=2)1=K ] :
Simple algebra reveals that pK is decreasing with K and that pK converges to
'= ln 2, which is strictly bigger than '; as K grows arbitrarily large. Hence, we
have established:
Proposition 2 Suppose F = 1. Irrespective of K, the rm can attain a price no
smaller than '= ln 2; which is strictly larger than '.
As described in (4), the distribution used to establish Proposition 2 requires
that there is no upper bound on the signals that can be sent by the rm (h(K) =
'=[1   (1=2)1=K ] goes to innity as K goes to innity). If there were an upper
bound (as considered in Section 6), the variance of the distribution would have to
be bounded, and the rm would not be able to obtain a price of its stock much
away from the fundamental when K is large.
5 Oligopoly
We now turn to our main questions of interest: How does an increase in the
number of rms competing in the stock market a¤ect the mispricing of stocks and
can the mispricing if any persist as the number of rms grows large?
It is not a priori clear in which way increasing the number F of rms may drive
the mispricing. Inducing a higher market clearing price would require attracting
more demand and so tilt the nancial reporting distribution toward higher signals.
Yet, since the mean of the distribution has to coincide with the fundamental, that
would have to be counter-balanced by having more weight on low signals, which
would trigger more supply. This makes it hard to identify how the most relevant
deviations would look like and so what e¤ect competition may have on stock prices.
We divide our investigation into various subsections. Our main result appears in
Proposition 5.
5.1 A non-transparency result
A rst observation is that no matter how many rms are competing on the stock
market, it cannot be an equilibrium that (all) rms choose a transparent nancial
reporting interpreted as a reporting distribution concentrated on the fundamental
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value. Indeed, if all rms choose  = f'; 1g, then obviously the market clearing
price for all stocks is p = ' and no rm would be perceived as o¤ering any gain
from trade. But, suppose that rm j chooses the distribution displayed in the
monopoly case; that is, j = f0; 1=2; 2'; 1=2g when K = 1: Then trading other
stocks at price ' would be viewed as o¤ering no gains from trade, and as a result
one can assume that all trades take place on stock j. As shown in Section 3, rm j
can obtain a price of its stock as high as 2', thereby showing that the deviation is
protable. This observation carries over to any specication of K (by Proposition
2), thereby allowing us to derive:
Proposition 3 Irrespective of F and K, there is no equilibrium in which rms
choose as their reporting strategy a distribution concentrated on the fundamental
value.
A second observation is that, irrespective of the strategy used by others, a rm
can always guarantee that the price of its stock is at least the fundamental value.
Indeed if rm j chooses j = f'; 1g then pj = ' is necessarily a market clearing
price for j (and there is no other possible market clearing price for j if some of
the stocks j are to be traded). This establishes the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 In all equilibria, the price of stocks is no smaller than the funda-
mental value.
5.2 The highest price equilibrium
Characterizing all equilibria is somewhat di¢ cult because it requires getting into
comparative statics properties of the Walrasian equilibria of the stock market as
induced by the various possible choices of reporting strategies of the rms (which
in turn a¤ect in a complex way the demand and supply of the various stocks
through the sampling heuristic).19
To keep the analysis tractable, we consider the case in which investors only
consider one activity in the nancial report, i.e. K = 1. Moreover, we restrict our
attention to symmetric equilibria. That is, we require that in equilibrium rms
choose the same distribution of signals, the prices of the various stocks are the
same, and the tie-breaking rule is anonymous.20 Among symmetric equilibria, we
19The theory of general equilibrium has essentially produced existence and e¢ ciency results
but very few instances in which Walrasian prices can be explicitly derived from the demand and
supply structure. For our purpose, it is the latter that is required though.
20That is, if a mass  of investors ends up with the same assessment about a set of N rms,
each of these rms receives a fraction =N of the trades.
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focus on the equilibrium that induces the highest prices of stocks. There are two
ways to think of such a focus: 1) It highlights how much the prices can be far from
the fundamental. 2) It is a natural benchmark equilibrium if we have in mind that
the rms in the stock market can coordinate on the equilibrium they like best.
We will also in the next subsection discuss other (symmetric) equilibria, thereby
showing the range of prices that can be sustained in equilibrium.
In order to characterize the highest price symmetric equilibrium, we proceed
in several steps. First, we characterize among the symmetric distributions of
signals and anonymous tie-breaking rules the ones that induce the largest common
clearing price of stocks. Then, we show that such a symmetric distribution of
signals and anonymous tie-breaking rule together with the corresponding prole
of prices constitutes an equilibrium, thereby leading to a characterization of the
highest price symmetric equilibrium.
5.2.1 Market clearing
Consider a strategy prole f; p; !g ; such that each rm chooses the same distri-
bution  = fx1; 1;x2; 2; :::g, p denotes the common market clearing price and !
is an anonymous tie-breaking rule. We rst note that  may induce the highest
price in this class only if it satises the following property: There must be no
signal x > 0 which is in the support of  and such that signal ~x = 2p   x is not
in the support of : That is, all positive signals in the support of  need to be
paired around the price. To see this, suppose by contradiction that  assigns mass
x > 0 to an unpaired signal x (i.e., there is no mass on 2p   x). Suppose also
for the sake of the argument that x > p. Then one could obtain the same price
by moving x to the lower adjacent signal x^ in the support of  (or to p if there is
no signal between x and p). The average of the distribution would be reduced by
x(x  x^): This would then allow us to increase all signals and so the price by the
same amount, thereby showing that the distribution did not induce the highest
price. In what follows, we say that b 2 ^ if b 2  (as dened by conditions (1)
and (2)) and all positive signals in b are paired around some p interpreted as the
price.
The second step in our argument is to observe that to achieve the largest price,
the distribution ^ 2 ^ should assign positive weight to at most three signals. To
see this, suppose that ^ assigns positive weight to n signals and n > 3: Then one
can dene another distribution  2 ^ which involves at most n   1 signals and
that induces a price ~p  p (assuming again an anonymous tie-breaking rule and
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that j = ~ for all j). The idea is to remove the two signals closest to the price
and move their mass either to the price (if the weight of the higher of the two
signals is no smaller than the weight of the smaller one) or to the adjacent signals
further away from the price (if the weight of the smaller signal is bigger than the
weight of the higher signal), and then increase all signals and the price upward so
as to accommodate the aggregation condition.
Iterating the argument, one gets a distribution with at most three signals,
0; p; 2p. Then, one can move equal mass from p to 0 and 2p or vice-versa with-
out changing the market clearing price. Thus, we end up with a two-signal dis-
tribution which takes one of the following forms: a = f0; 1  a; 2pa; ag or
b = f0; 1  b; pb; bg. Consider a. Investors are indi¤erent between trading
stock j and stock r whenever they sample signal 2pa from rm j and signal 0
from rm r. The highest aggregate demand is obtained by letting investors buy
j whenever indi¤erent between buying j and selling another stock. In that case,
the aggregate supply includes only the mass of those traders who sample signal 0
from all rms, which has probability (1   a)F : Hence, market clearing requires
(1  a)F  1=2: If (1  a)F < 1=2; one can decrease slightly a and increase all
signals by " and obtain a price which is " higher. Hence, among distributions a,
the price is maximized by setting a =  where
 = 1  (1=2)1=F : (5)
The highest market clearing price from distributions a is thus obtained with
 = f0; 1  ;'=; g ; (6)





With simple algebra, one can show that no distribution in b can achieve a price
which is higher than p: This in turn leads to the next Lemma, whose detailed
proof appears in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Assume that for some b 2 , j = b for all j, and consider an
anonymous tie-breaking rule. The resulting market clearing price bp is no larger
than p; as dened in (7). Moreover, p is obtained with the distribution ; as
dened in (5) and (6).
17
5.2.2 Deviations
We now show that when j = , pj = p for all j, no rm can protably deviate,
so indeed the distribution  and the price is p together with the anonymous
tie-breaking rule that favors demand over supply in case of indi¤erence dene an
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 There is a symmetric equilibrium in which rms choose the distribution
 and the price is p; as dened respectively in (6) and (7).
To get a sense of why Lemma 2 holds true, consider (; p; !) where  and
p are dened by (6) and (7) and ! is the tie-breaking rule favoring demand over
supply in case of indi¤erence. Assume by contradiction that there is a deviation
by one rm, say rm j that would lead to a market clearing price pj > p for rm
j and a market clearing price p0 for the non-deviating rms (in the Appendix, we
allow for the case in which the non-deviating rms have di¤erent market clearing
prices) and let h = 2p(= '=).
We rst note that p0  h=2 as p0 > h=2 would imply excess supply for the
non-deviating rm and thus make market clearing impossible (remember that
(1  )F 1 > 1=2 whenever (1  )F = 1=2).
We next observe that the total weight on signals of rm j above pj + p0 should
be no smaller than  as otherwise there would be excess aggregate supply over
the stocks of all rms (remember again that (1  )F = 1=2).
If p0 = h=2 as before rm js deviation, the aggregation condition (2) would
not hold given the observation just made that the weight of rm jsignals above
p + p0 should be no smaller than , and pj > h=2 = p0.
One may then wonder whether having a smaller p0 < h=2 could help alleviating
the constraint (2). To see that this cannot be the case, observe that the total
weight of rm j signals strictly below pj   p0 cannot exceed some threshold x as
otherwise there would be excess supply for rm j (investors sell stock j whenever
such a signal is drawn with signals 0 from the non-deviating rms). Besides, such
a threshold x gets arbitrarily small as F grows large.
Given the above observations, the mean of the distribution of signals of rm
j is no smaller than (pj + p0) + (1      x)(pj   p0), but since x is small this
expression decreases with p0. As for p0 = h=2 it is strictly larger than ', the
aggregation condition (2) cannot be satised for any p0  h=2.
We conclude from the above that there can be no deviation of rm j that




Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we have our main result:
Proposition 5 Suppose K = 1 and F > 1. The maximal price achieved in a




: This price increases in F:
The reason why the price of stocks p increases with F is as follows. The price
of a given rm j must reect the median (here also the average) of the valuations
of those who trade rm j: This however di¤ers from the average valuation across
all investors, as not all investors trade all rms. That is what opens the possibility
of distorting prices when many rms compete in the market. More precisely, in
the equilibrium of Proposition 5, investors sell stock j only when they sample F
low signals (from all rms).21 For a given frequency of high signal, the more rms,
the lower the chance that the signals drawn from all rms are low. In this way,
bad evaluations are less likely to be reected in market prices when the number
of rms increases, and as a result the price p increases with F .
A question arises as to how the market clearing price in the competitive case
compares with the monopoly price (see Proposition 1) for various F . Simple cal-
culations reveal that the price in the duopoly case is smaller than in the monopoly
case, but the price for any other market structure conguration (F > 2) is larger
than in the monopoly case.22
It should also be noted that in our setting the total number of signals that
investors pay attention to increases with the number of rms (since investors
consider one signal from each rm irrespective of F ). In this way, we highlight the
e¤ect of competition among rms over investorstrades rather than over investors
attention.23 One may ask how our construction would be a¤ected if investors could
process at most S signals say, and so they would sample one signal from at most S
rms. Proposition 5 would hold by substituting F with min fF; Sg. When F > S;
our result would then be interpreted as showing that mispricing increases when
investors are allowed to pay attention to more rms.
21Notice that this tie-breaking rule is not imposed ex ante but it is determined in equilibrium.
In fact, given the distribution  chosen by the rms, this is the only tie-breaking rule which
allows to reach an equilibrium as dened in Denition 1.
22These considerations imply that if a monopolistic rm could split its activity into several
companies with di¤erent stocks, it would benet from it given the heuristic of the investors.
23Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) provide evidence consistent with the idea that information
is less likely to be incorporated in market prices when many signals compete for investors
attention.
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Finally, we conjecture that our insight that more competition may drive the
price further away from the fundamental would continue to hold had we consid-
ered arbitrary K > 1. While the analysis would become quite cumbersome, we
conjecture that the above arguments can be replicated by considering the distrib-
ution  = f0; 1  ;h; g ; where  is dened by (1   )FK = 1=2 and the price
p = '=2K:24
5.3 Other Equilibria
We now highlight that, apart from the highest price symmetric equilibrium de-
scribed above, other (symmetric) equilibria may arise. To illustrate this, we exhibit
a symmetric equilibrium that induces a market clearing price as low as the fun-
damental (which combined with Propositions 4 and 5 allows us to show the range
of market clearing prices that can be sustained in symmetric equilibria). More
precisely, we have:
Proposition 6 Suppose K = 1. For every F > 1, there is a symmetric equi-
librium with market clearing prices p = ': The common distribution of signals
has support (0; 2'). It is centered around ', and it is such that the probability of
sampling F   1 signals within distance z from ' is linear in z. When F = 2, it is
the uniform distribution on (0; 2').
To get some intuition for Proposition 6, consider the duopoly case F = 2. If
rm 1 chooses a uniform distribution of signals between 0 and 2', it is not hard
to see that irrespective of the choice of distribution of rm 2, the market clearing
price for rm 1 must be p1 = '. Indeed at this price, and given the symmetry of
the distribution of rm 1 around ', there is as much demand as there is supply
for rm 1 (whatever the choice of distribution of rm 2). More important for our
purpose though is the observation that when rm 1 chooses such a distribution,
the market clearing price of rm 2 cannot be larger than '. If the support of
the distribution of rm 2 coincides with (0; 2'), one can show that the market
clearing price of the two rms has to be '. This is because 1) any signal s2 > p2
generates a demand for rm 2 proportional to s2   p2 (that corresponds to the
probability that s1 satises js1   p1j < s2   p2 conditional on s2), 2) any signal
24Notice that, for K large and F small, this price may not exceed the fundamental. The
comparative statics exercise should then be conducted for F su¢ ciently large.
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s2 < p2 generates a supply for rm 2 proportional to p2   s2, and 3)
2'Z
'




for all densities f() with support (0; 2') satisfying the aggregation condition (2).
Moreover, any positive measure of signal above 2' would lead to a strictly lower
price for rm 2. This in turn establishes Proposition 6 for the duopoly case and the
argument can be generalized for an arbitrary number of rms (see the Appendix).
Two further comments about the equilibrium displayed in Proposition 6 are
worth mentioning. First, as F increases, the corresponding distribution of signals
becomes more concentrated around ' (so for this equilibrium, more competition
eventually induces nancial reports that get close to reporting just their funda-
mental value). Second, the equilibrium shown in Proposition 6 su¤ers from the
following fragility. While the equilibrium requires that rms choose a distribu-
tion with continuous density, an obvious alternative (and simpler) best-response
would be for the rms to report just their fundamental value. Yet, if rms were to
choose such a nancial reporting strategy, this would not be an equilibrium (see
Proposition 3).
6 Discussion
In this Section, we discuss the role of our main assumptions. We break the discus-
sion into several subsections. We rst consider our main assumptions on investors:
bounded rationality and trading limits. We then consider a number of other ex-
tensions. We consider the case in which the nancial report distribution must
be bounded from above, then the case in which it must contain a summary sta-
tistic regarding the aggregate protability. We also discuss the possibility that
fundamental values be asymmetric and private information to rms. Finally, we
discuss the e¤ect of correlation in investorsdraws and of the presence of some
fully rational investors in our setting.
6.1 Bounded rationality
We rst discuss in somewhat general terms the role of bounded rationality in
our setting, we then analyze the robustness of our results to modications of our
specic modeling of bounded rationality.
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6.1.1 Why bounded rationality
A key question is which of our insights could be derived in a setting with fully
rational investors. Specically, what if investors in our setting could draw correct
inferences from the signals they receive and the levels of prices (as in Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), say)?
In order to make the problem interesting, our basic setup should be somewhat
modied. First, we should assume that fundamental values are stochastic and
private information to rms. Otherwise, any investor if rational would assess the
value of the rms as ' irrespective of the signals received. Second, we should
introduce some reasons to trade which are not purely speculative. Otherwise, as
long as investors hold a common prior about the distributions of fundamental
values, they would not be willing to trade in equilibrium (Milgrom and Stokey
(1982)) even if rms were to engage in strategic information disclosure about the
realization of their fundamental values. Suppose one introduces noise traders (as
in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or in De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann
(1990a)) who would trade not based on informational inferences. In a setting in
which the mass of such investors would be stochastic, the inference that ratio-
nal traders could make from the price would be imperfect. As Albagli, Hellwig
and Tsyvinski (2012) show, in a setting with trading constraints, prices may de-
part from fundamentals even when informed investors employ standard Bayesian
reasoning.
Bounded rationality in our setting should not be viewed just as a way to gener-
ate mispricing (which, as just mentioned, may occur also with Bayesian investors).
Rather, it is a way to provide a precise structure on the behavior of non-fully ra-
tional traders. Apart from being of interest in itself (as discussed above, we think
this is a behaviorally plausible heuristic), such an explicit foundation is required
so as to dene how rms can inuence beliefs, and then address our main question
of how manipulations may depend on the degree of sophistication of investors and
of market competition.
The sign of the mispricing due to noise traders (as in De Long et al. (1990a)
or in Albagli et al. (2012)) may be di¢ cult to predict in traditional nancial
market models in which non-noise traders are assumed to be fully rational. Indeed,
the mispricing may go in either direction depending on how information and the
mass of noise traders are distributed (see Albagli et al. (2012)). This is di¤erent
from our approach in which bounded rationality induces predictable deviations
from fundamentals. Moreover, as the behaviors of noise traders are usually set
22
exogenously in those models, it is not clear how rms would be able to inuence it.
Finally, in the above mentioned literature, the set of signals from which (rational)
traders gather information is typically set exogenously. Our key interest is instead
in deriving these signals from the reporting strategies chosen by the various rms.
This makes our focus quite distinct from the literature on nancial markets
with heterogeneous beliefs and noise traders and we think it o¤ers a di¤erent
perspective. The perspectives should be viewed as complementary.
6.1.2 Alternative heuristics
One way in which our investors could be made more sophisticated is by enriching
the set of elements they consider when assessing rmsvalues. For example, in-
vestors could consider that the price itself is indicative of the fundamental value.
Alternatively, investors could base their estimates not only on the part of the -
nancial report they pay attention to but also on the market sentiment (De Long
et al. (1990a)). Finally, investors could take into account that their estimate is
noisy and adjust their investment decision accordingly.
There are several possible ways to incorporate such ideas into the heuristic of
investors; we review some of them. In the main model, investor imade an estimate
of the fundamental value of rm j based on the average sample signal x^ji from j.
Suppose instead that investor i assesses the fundamental value of rm j according
to
vji = ip
j + (1  i)x^ji ; (8)
where i 2 [0; 1) reects the subjective weight attached by investor i to the in-
formativeness of the price relative to the informativeness of the private signal x^ji .
Trading j would be assessed to give gains of
pj   vji  = (1 i) pj   x^ji  and thus,
our previous analysis would apply equally to this new specication. In a richer
model, the weight i could be derived endogenously (and it could a priori depend
on j as well). The (specic) reduced-form approach in (8) is meant to illustrate
that introducing some coarse inference from the price need not change the logic
developed above.
The idea of "market sentiment" can be modeled using the average belief of
the various investors about the protability of the rm. As already noted, in
our setting, the average belief about rm j corresponds to its fundamental value.
Thus, an investor i receiving an average sample x^ji from j would assess rm j
according to
vji = '+ (1  )x^ji ; (9)
23
where  2 [0; 1) represents the weight given to the market sentiment. The gains
from trade attached to asset j would be perceived as
pj   '  (1  )x^ji , and the
main messages of our previous analysis would remain qualitatively the same. AsK
grows large in the monopoly case, the price would be bounded by '+(1 )'= ln 2;
which exceeds ': In the oligopoly case with K = 1, as F grows large, the maximal
price sustainable in equilibrium would be ' + (1   )p; where p denotes the
price characterized in Section 5.
Finally, we could incorporate the idea that investors would take into account
that their estimate of the fundamental value is noisy. For example, when investors
draw several signals K > 1, instead of simply considering the mean of the signal
and reason as if it were the fundamental value, investors could also consider the
empirical variance in the sample and reason as if the fundamental value was a
random variable normally distributed with mean and variance coinciding with
the corresponding empirical values in the sample. With risk neutral investors (as
we assumed) this would have no consequence. With risk-averse investors, it is not
clear a priori in which way our main analysis would change given that both buying
and short selling would be perceived as risky. A more systematic investigation of
such heuristics should be the subject of future work.
6.2 Trading constraints
Assuming that investors can only trade one unit of one stock is, of course, special.
More generally, trade orders may be smooth functions of the perceived gains from
trade, and investors may trade several rms.
Consider the monopoly case F = 1 with a sample size K = 1. Letting x^i and
p denote, respectively, the perceived value and price of the stock, we denote by
f(jx^i   pj) the demand (resp. supply) for the stock if x^i p > 0 (resp. x^i p < 0),
and we assume that f() is a smooth (in particular, continuous) function, thereby
implying that f(0) = 0.
Given that f(0) = 0, it is clear that it would not be possible to achieve a
price equal to the highest possible signal as in Proposition 1 (since at that price
there would be no demand). It is also clear that if f() is linear everywhere the
price would correspond to the average of investorsbeliefs, which would be equal
to the fundamental value. As we now show, however, the rm can achieve a price
strictly above the fundamental whenever f() is non-linear (at least somewhere
between 0 and '). Suppose for example that f() is strictly concave and the rm
chooses the distribution f'  "  ; 1=2  ;'+ "; 1=2 + g ; where ";  and  are
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positive. At p = ', the demand would be (1=2 + )f(") while the supply would
be (1=2   )f(" + ): By concavity of f(); the demand would exceed the supply
and so market clearing would require p > ': More generally, we have:
Proposition 7 Suppose that K = F = 1 and f() is strictly concave or strictly
convex in a neighborhood W  [0; ']. The rm can achieve a price p > ':
The above proposition establishes that the kind of distortions exhibited in the
monopoly case would continue to hold whenever the demand is not linear in the
perceived gains from trade. We believe that there are many practical reasons
why such non-linearities could arise. For example, if investors face wealth and
short selling constraints, they may not be able to trade as much as they wish of
a given rm. Alternatively, if they face trading costs, they may not trade when
perceived gains are too small. More generally, one can think of portfolio choice
models in which investors consider increasing their exposure to a given stock by
trading o¤ perceived expected benet against perceived increase in risk. Outside
the case of normally distributed risk and CARA preferences, smooth non-linear
demand/supply functions may naturally arise.
Consider next the oligopoly case with F > 1. Observe rst that in the equilib-
rium considered in Proposition 5, both buyers and sellers perceive the same gain
from trade (that is, p). Hence, the market clearing condition is not a¤ected by
the specic form of the function f(). Moreover, as we now show, no rm can
protably deviate by choosing alternative reporting strategies provided that f()
is su¢ ciently concave.
Proposition 8 Suppose that K = 1, F > 1 and that f(x) = xz; with z < 1=2.
There is a symmetric equilibrium in which rms choose the distribution  and
the price is p; as dened respectively in (6) and (7).
To get an intuition for the result, suppose a rm deviates and o¤ers some very
high signals. As demand is now strictly increasing in gains from trade, this would
tend to push the price of the deviating rm up. At the same time, other signals
must be decreased in order to meet the aggregation condition (2), and this tends
to push the price down. If f() does not increase su¢ ciently fast with gains from
trade, the second e¤ect dominates, and the proposed deviation is not protable.
The proof extends the argument to arbitrary deviations. We conclude that the
insight that mispricing may increase with the number of rms, and in particular
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the equilibrium construction developed in Proposition 5, does not depend on the
extreme form of demand considered in the main analysis.25
Similarly, the e¤ect of competition appears robust to the possibility that in-
vestors (for reasons which we have not introduced) may trade several rms. Sup-
pose for example that investors would trade the M most protable rms, where
M < F . Following the logic of Proposition 5, investors may be induced to sell
only if they end up with fewer than M good evaluations, and this is less likely
to occur as F gets large. Hence, to the extent that an investor cannot trade all
stocks, prices would be less a¤ected by bad evaluations as many rms compete
in the market, and we conjecture that our main conclusion that competition may
magnify mispricing would continue to hold.
6.3 Further extensions
6.3.1 Upper bound on rmsreports
In our baseline model, rms were free to report signals with arbitrarily large
values. One may question how our results would be a¤ected if we were to impose
an upper bound on rmsdistribution. As already mentioned, the logic developed
in Proposition 2 would not hold in this case, and a monopolistic rm would not be
able to obtain a price much larger than ' when the sample size K gets arbitrarily
large. By contrast, and perhaps more interestingly, the result that competition
need not eliminate and may even increase mispricing would be preserved.
To see this, assume that the support of the distribution used by rm j must
be in the range [0; H]: If H  '=(F ); where (F ) is dened in (5), then the
upper bound does not bind and the previous analysis applies. Consider then




1  2(F ) ; 2'

: (10)
As we show in the next Proposition, the highest symmetric equilibrium price in
this case is achieved with the distribution H = fl; 1  (F );H;(F )g in which
the tie-breaking rule is anonymous and most favorable to demand and  is dened
25The analysis of the case in which demand would be of the form f(x) = xz with z > 12 is left
for future research.
26
as in (5) by the market clearing condition (1  )F = 1=2:26 This price is
pH(F ) =
H + l(F )
2
; (11)
where due to the aggregation condition (2)
l(F ) =
'  (F )H
1  (F ) :
By the same logic as that explained in Section 5,  decreases in F , which allows
to increase l and so pH . In the limit as F gets arbitrarily large, l gets close
to ' and pH converges to (' + H)=2. That is, as in our previous analysis, the
maximal equilibrium price increases in the number of competing rms, but now
the maximum price never goes beyond (' + H)=2. We collect these observations
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 9 Suppose that signals must be in the range [0; H] and H  ~H; as
dened in (10). The maximal price achieved in a symmetric equilibrium increases
in F , and converges to ('+H)=2 as F gets arbitrarily large.
This result sheds some light on a policy intervention intended to impose an
upper bound on reports (whereby for example reporting too high protability in
some dimensions would lead to investigations). First, such a bound may be di¢ cult
to dene based on the behavior of similar rms in the market. The equilibrium
we describe is symmetric so in a sense no rm appears "too protable" relative
to its competitors. Second, even if such an upper bound were implemented, it
would a¤ect the level of mispricing but not the potentially detrimental role of
competition in our setting.
6.3.2 Reporting overall protability
One may object to our main modelling assumptions that real world nancial re-
ports typically contain a mention of the aggregate protability of the rm in ad-
dition to more disaggregated details that motivated our main model. If investors
only paid attention to these aggregate gures, there would be no disagreement
26As detailed in the proof, the condition H  2' ensures that H induces a higher price than
a three signals distribution which puts positive mass on signals 0; s and H and induces a price
(s +H)=2: The condition H  '=(1   2) ensures that H induces a higher price than a two
signals distribution which puts positive mass on signals 0 and h and induces a price h.
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between them. Yet, we believe this view is at odds with the evidence that dis-
agreement between investors tends to increase upon the release of nancial reports
(see the references in footnote 5). To be in line with this evidence, we propose that
while investors would put some weight  on the aggregate protability, they would
also put some complementary weight 1   on disaggregated protability data in
an attempt to make a better estimate about future protability of the rms. Since
investors may hold di¤erent beliefs as to which activities will a¤ect most future
protability, we could consider that investor i assesses the fundamental value of
rm j according to vji = '+(1 )x^ji ; where x^ji is the average protability among
activities considered as most representative of rm j by investor i, and ' is the
aggregate protability as truthfully reported by rm j. That formulation would
be equivalent (in reduced form) to that of equation (9).
6.3.3 Asymmetric and/or stochastic fundamentals
We have so far assumed that all rms have the same fundamental value '; which
is deterministic and commonly known among rms. We consider relaxing each of
these assumptions. First, note that extending the denitions of the equilibrium
to the cases of asymmetric and/or stochastic fundamentals raises no di¢ culties.
Second, we now show that the logic of our analysis extends to these cases.
Clearly, in the monopoly case, nothing would be changed by allowing the
fundamental ' to be randomly determined. For each realization of ', the obtained
price would be the one derived above for this value of the fundamental. More
challenging though is the analysis of competition when fundamental values may
be asymmetric and/or stochastically determined.
Consider rst the case of asymmetric (though deterministic) fundamentals.
Firm j has fundamental value 'j = ' + "j and assume that 0  "1  "2  :::"F
(without loss of generality). The following proposition identies an equilibrium in
the same spirit as the one described in Proposition 5, in which (F ) = 1 (1=2)1=F
and p(F ) = '=2(F ) as dened in equations (5) and (7). This equilibrium
requires that heterogeneity among rms is not too large. In particular, as detailed
below, it requires






2=2 for F = 2;
2(p   ') for F > 2:
Proposition 10 Suppose rm j has fundamental value 'j = ' + "j, and as-
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sume that K = 1 and "F  "(F ). There is an equilibrium in which j =
f"j; 1  (F ); 2p(F ) + "j; (F )g and the prices are pj = p(F ) + "j for all j.
These prices increase in F .
Given that "(F ) grows arbitrarily large as F increases, if for all i, "i < ~" for
some constant ~", then for F large enough, it must be that "F < "(F ) and thus
Proposition 10 applies. Moreover, in this equilibrium, adding more rms has the
e¤ect of increasing p(F ) and thus the price of all rms.
Compared to Proposition 5, the main di¤erence is that rm j may consider
using signals lower than the lowest signal in the support of the reporting strategy
(given that "j > 0). The reason for the extra condition (12) can be understood as
follows. First, rm j with fundamental value 'j = '+ "j can deviate and choose
the distribution f0; 1=2; 2'+ 2"j; 1=2g. At prices pj = 2' + 2"j   p and pr = p
for r 6= j, rm j would attract all investors and the market would clear. For this
to be unprotable, it should be that p + "j  2'+ 2"j   p; which must hold in
particular for the most protable rm, thereby explaining that "F  2(p(F ) ')
is required. Second, when F = 2, a deviation of rm j to f0; ; pj; 1  g
would induce prices pj = (' + "j)=(1   ) and pr = "r for r 6= j: For this to
be unprotable, it should be that p(F ) + "j  p2(' + "j); which for the most
protable rm writes "F  'p2=2: It turns out that all deviations are taken care
of when "F < "(F ), as dened above.
It should be noted that in the equilibrium of Proposition 10, the strategy of rm
j depends only on her own fundamental value 'j. This has nice implications for
the case in which the fundamental values would be stochastically drawn. Indeed,
assume that the fundamental value 'j of rm j, j = 1:::F , is now stochastically
drawn from a distribution with support ['; '+ "(F )], and that only rm j knows
the realization of 'j. Dene for each rm j receiving the fundamental value 'j the
strategy j('j) = f"j; 1  (F ); 2p(F ) + "j; (F )g where "j = 'j  '; together
with the price pj('j) = p(F ) + "j. Because such strategies constitute an ex-post
equilibrium (i.e. they remain in equilibrium after the realization of all fundamental
values are known), we have:
Proposition 11 The above strategies and prices are part of a Bayes-Nash equi-
librium whatever the joint distribution of fundamentals.
Together Propositions 10 and 11 show that our main results regarding the
destabilizing e¤ect of competition is robust to the introduction of asymmetries,
private information, and randomness in rmsfundamental values.
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6.3.4 Correlation in investorsdraws
We have so far assumed that the draws from rmsreports are made independently
across investors. As discussed in the Introduction, this allows us to generate het-
erogeneous beliefs and that is what generates trade in our setting. It should be
noted that, from a theoretical perspective, such an assumption is a priori the
most favorable to market e¢ ciency. Introducing some systematic correlation in
investorsdraws, e.g. allowing that some signals are known to receive more at-
tention than others, typically weakens the e¤ect of condition (2) and is likely to
increase the scope for distortions. Yet, as a complement to our benchmark model
with independent draws, it may be interesting to explore the e¤ect of correlation
in investorsdraws. For example, such a correlation may capture the idea that
investors are inuenced by nancial analysts who often look at the same aspects
of the nancial reports.
As a step toward this, suppose that each investor pays attention to N + K
signals from each rms report. Among them, signals x1; ::; xN are observed by all
investors. The remaining K signals are sampled independently across investors












i denotes the average of the
signals sampled from the rest of the report. Since rms can choose reports with
an arbitrarily large number of signals, the aggregation condition (2) is not a¤ected
by the chosen values x1; ::; xN . It follows that if rms know which signals investors
commonly pay attention to, they would report arbitrarily large protability in
these signals and they could induce arbitrarily large evaluations. If instead reports
are bounded from above by H as in Section 6.3.1, rms would set xs = H for
s = 1; ::; N and choose the remaining signals so as to maximize the market clearing
price subject to condition (2). The problem is similar to the one analyzed in the
baseline model and the previous insights can be applied. If F = K = 1 and








Similarly, the analysis of Section 4, 5 and 6.3.1 can be used to dene the corre-
sponding price as one increases K or F . Hence, the e¤ects identied in our main
model remain qualitatively unchanged.
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Suppose instead that rms do not know the set of signals which is commonly
observed by all investors. That creates some randomness on the market clearing
price. But, the previous analysis extends by noting that rms expect a valuation
' from the N signals commonly observed, so that the expected price now is a
weighted average between ' and the price as derived in the main analysis. Of
course, the randomness on the price would be exacerbated if one considered a
market with a small number of investors (or with a small number of analysts who
mediate between rms and investors). A more complete analysis of such extensions
should be the subject of future research.
6.3.5 Introducing rational investors
We now consider the e¤ect of introducing some fully rational investors. Suppose
investors are either fully rational (K = 1) with probability  or they follow
the K- sampling procedure (with K < 1) with probability 1   . In line with
our baseline model, we assume that investors whether fully rational or boundedly
rational can trade only one stock, and that the fundamental values of all rms are
the same.
Given that the fundamental value of each rm is deterministic, rational in-
vestors know it with certainty. Given that the price is typically above the fun-
damental value, rational investors would all go for short selling. Our equilib-
rium constructions of Sections 3, 4, 5 should then be modied by adding a
share  to the aggregate supply. In Section 4, market clearing would require
(1 )K(1 )+ = 1=2: In Section 5, it would require (1 )F (1 )+ = 1=2:
One can replicate the same analysis as above with the modied market clearing
conditions. It is not di¢ cult to show that, provided  is not too large, our previous
insights carry over.
Notice that the same logic would apply if we assumed that assets were in
positive net supply. The level of prices would mechanically decrease (given that
investors have a limited buying capacity), but the comparative statics would re-
main unchanged.
7 Conclusion
This paper has considered a stylized nancial market in which rms strategically
frame their nancial reports so as to inuence investorsbeliefs and induce higher
stock prices. We have illustrated how the introduction of less sophisticated, ex-
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trapolative investors in such a setting could alter dramatically the analysis of
market e¢ ciency. We have shown that a form of investor protection requesting
that overall there should be no lie in the nancial reporting need not restore market
e¢ ciency. Moreover, capital market competition has been shown to be ine¤ective
in ensuring that prices are close to fundamentals.
Our model is obviously stylized and open to several extensions. In particu-
lar, it would be interesting to explore more generally the incentives to manipulate
beliefs as a function of which investors -along the distribution of beliefs- are key
to determine the market price. Another interesting extension would be to add
a time component to the belief formation given that some forms of accounting
manipulation occur over time (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995)). Finally,
future research may also explore the empirical implications of the model. Our
results suggest that the complexity of information provided by rms should be
positively correlated to investorsdisagreement and to trading prices. In particu-
lar, according to Proposition 5, positively skewed distribution of beliefs should be
associated with overpricing, and this e¤ect should be stronger in settings in which
many rms compete for investorstrades. To our knowledge, this link remains to
be explored empirically.
From a broader perspective, even though our paper emphasizes the extrap-
olative nature of investorsheuristics, the results reported here can be viewed as
illustrative of a more general theme. It has long been understood, since Harrison
and Kreps (1978), that speculative trade can arise if investors have heterogeneous
(subjective) beliefs, say about the protability of the various rms. What our
approach suggests is that rms may try to inuence the formation of subjective
beliefs, here through their release of nancial reports. We have seen how, within
our framework, such manipulation could lead to overpricing in the stock market.
We believe such a theme of subjective belief manipulation should be the sub-
ject of active research in the future, as it seems relevant to explain a number of
dysfunctionings in nancial markets.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
As shown in the text, the price pM = 2' clears the market when the rm
sends the distribution M = f0; 1=2; 2'; 1=2g : We now show that no distribu-
tion induces a higher price. Suppose that the rm sends the distribution  =
fx0; 0;x1; 1;x2; 2; ::;xN ; Ng with 0 = x0 < x1 < x2 < ::: < xN and n  0 for
n = 0; :::; N: (We consider a discrete distribution for simplicity of notation, the
argument is the same if we consider continuous distributions.) Market clearing
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requires that the price is the median of the distribution. If there are several medi-
ans (because of the discreteness of the distribution), then considering the largest
median is enough to characterize the largest market clearing price. Thus, we let
p = xN if N  1=2; p = xN 1 if N < 1=2 and N + N 1  1=2; and more
generally for n 2 [1; N   1]
p = xn; if
N n 1X
w=0




Maximizing xn while satisfying the above constraints and the constraint in (2)
requires setting w = 0 for all w 2 [1; n  1]. Moreover, by setting xw = xn for all
w 2 [n+1; N ], xn can be increased, and so p can be increased, while still satisfying
condition (2). Hence, we are left with a distribution  = f0; 1  ;xn; g with
  1=2. Condition (2) requires xn  '=: As we need   1=2 to have p > 0; it
follows that xn  2': Thus, no alternative distribution can induce a price higher
than pM : Q. E. D.
Proof of Lemma 1
Part 1. We rst show that the distribution  cannot induce the highest price if
there is a signal x > 0 which is in the support of  (that is, to which the distribution
 assigns positive mass) and such that signal ~x = 2p  x is not in the support of
: Consider the equilibrium prole f; p; !g ; where p is the market clearing price
and ! is an anonymous tie-breaking rule, and suppose by contradiction that 
assigns mass x > 0 to signal x and no mass to signal ~x: Suppose rst that x > p
and there is a signal x^ 2 [p; x) such that  assigns mass x^ > 0 to x^ and no mass
to any other signal between x and x^: Consider the alternative distribution ~ in
which the mass x is moved to signal x^: Under the original distribution ; the



















F   y (x^)
F 1 y(z)y +W;
where z denotes the total mass of signals that are at a distance to the price smaller
than x^ is, z =
P
fn s.t. 2p x^<xn<x^g n; andW is una¤ected by the proposed change
in the distribution. The demand for each rm under the new distribution ~ can
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be written as








F   y (x + x^)
F 1 y(z)y +W:
Notice that the supply of each rm is una¤ected by the proposed change in the
distribution since signal ~x = 2p   x is not part of . Hence, given that D = ~D,
the same market clearing price p can be attained with the new distribution ~: At
the same time, the distribution ~ has a lower mean than , the di¤erence being
x(x   x^): This allows to increase all signals in ~ and so the price by the same
amount, thereby showing that the distribution  did not induce the highest price.
If there is no signal between x and p the same argument applies by moving the
mass x to p: If x < p; the argument is symmetric and the proposed change is to
move mass x to the highest signal x^ < x in the support of  or to zero if x is
the lowest signal in the support of : Hence, in what follows, we can restrict our
attention to distributions in the set ^ of distributions such that b 2  (as dened
by conditions (1) and (2)) and all positive signals in b are paired around some p
interpreted as the price.
Part 2. We now show that rms cannot attain a price strictly larger than p
with any distribution  2 ^: Suppose all rms choose the same distribution  2 ^
and consider a symmetric tie-breaking rule. Denote by p the market clearing price:




n ; ::; x
+
1 with
0  x 1 < :: < x n < p < x+n < :: < x+1 and x+t + x t = 2p for all t = 1; ::; n:
Suppose there are also atomless parts of the distribution over the intervals [a 1 ; b
 
1 ]
and [b+1 ; a
+








v ]; where 0  a 1 < b 1 < :: < a v < b v < p <
b+v < a
+












t = 2p for all t = 1; ::; v: In
steps 1-4, we show that one can induce a price p^  p by using a distribution with
at most two signals. In step 5, we show that no distribution with at most two
signals induces a price higher than p; as dened in (7): We conclude that p is
the maximal market clearing price when rms choose a distribution  2 ^:
Step 1. Consider signal x n ; x
+
n . Suppose x+n  x n and b n < x n ; that is,
there is no atomless part of the distribution at a lower distance from the price (we
consider the atomless parts of the distribution in step 3 below): Dene as X^ the
set of signals x in the support of the distribution such that there exists a signal
2p  x in the support of the distribution, that is
X^ =

x 2  : x  minx 1 ; a 1 		 ;
39
and denote by 0 the weight attached by  to signal 0: Then one can induce a
price p + 1; where 1  0 will be dened below, by rst moving x+n and x n to
p and then moving all signals x 2 X^ up by 1. To show this, we rst show that
by moving x+n and x
 
n to p one can induce the same market clearing price p and
employ a signal distribution whose mean is lower than ': Then, we can move all
signals x 2 X^ up by 1 to obtain a price p + 1 with a signal distribution in ^
whose average is ':
Suppose rms assign weight x+n + x n to signal p instead of assigning weights




n , respectively. Those who sample signal p for
all rms are indi¤erent between buying and selling. Denote by 1 the fraction of
them who buy. Suppose rst that, before the change in the distribution, whenever
an investor sampled signal x+n from rm j and signal x
 
n from rm |^ he bought











where Z1 depends on the signals further away from p and is una¤ected with the
proposed change. The new aggregate demand (after the change) is
D^1 = 1(x+n + x n )
F + Z1:
Hence, one can dene a 1 < 1 such that D^1 = D1 and so the market clears at p.
Similarly, if an investor sampling signal x+n from rm j and signal x
 
n from rm |^
sold stock |^; the old demand is ~D1 = (x+n )
F + Z1 and there exists a 1 < 1 such
that D^1 = D1: Notice that x+nx
+
n + x n x
 
n  (x+n + x n )p since x+n  x n and





n + x n x
 
n   (x+n + x n )p];
and move all signals x 2 X^ up by 1 so as to satisfy condition (2) and have a
price p+ 1: The resulting distribution still belongs to ^. The same logic will be
applied in the next steps.
Step 2. The procedure in step 1 can be repeated until one considers signals
x m; x
+
m where m  maxt
n
t : x+t < x t
o
(if x+n < x n ; then m = n), or until one
encounters an atomless part of the distribution at a lower distance from the price.
Suppose one ends up with weight p2 on signal p2 and market clearing requiring











to x+m 1 and then move all signals x 2 X^ up by some 2  0 so as to induce a
price p2 + 2:
Consider the following weights for x m 1, x
+
m 1 and p2, respectively: ^x m 1 =
x m + x m 1   k2; ^x+m 1 = x+m + x+m 1   k2; and ^p2 = p2 + 2k2: Suppose a
share m of those who sample signal p2 for all rms buy. We wish to dene a
k2 2 (0; x+m) and a m 2 (0; 1) such that p2 clears the market. Suppose rst that
whenever an investor samples signal x+m from rm j and signal x
 
m from rm |^ he

























The new aggregate demand (considering the same symmetric tie-breaking rule











 k2)y(x m 1 +x m +p2 +k2)
F y+m(p2 +2k2)
F +Z2:
Using the binomial theorem and the convexity of x ! xF for F  2; one can see
that D^2 > D2 when k2 = 0 and m = 1 and conversely D^2 < D2 when k2 = x+m
and m = 0: Hence, there exists a k2 2 (0; x+m) and a m 2 (0; 1) such that
D^2 = D2: A similar argument can be applied in the case that, before the change,
whenever an investor sampled signal x+m from rm j and signal x
 
m from rm |^ he
sold stock |^ and similarly for signals xm 1. Now one can move all signals x 2 X^












  (x+m + x+m 1   k2)x
+
m 1   (x m + x m 1   k2)x
 
m 1   2p2k2];
and 2  0 since x m  x+m ; so as to satisfy condition (2) and have a price
p2 + 2:





vs x+m 1 are drawn by satiating demand in one or the other.
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Step 3. Suppose one encounters an atomless part of the distribution and there
is no other signal at a lower distance from the price. Suppose the price is p3 and
consider the distribution with density g(x) over the interval [a n ; b
 
n ] and density
h(x) over [b+n ; a
+
n ]. The logic of the previous steps can be applied by dividing the
intervals [a n ; b
 




n ] into su¢ ciently small subintervals.




















If + >   and " ! 0; one can obtain a larger price by moving all signals
x 2 [b n   "; b n ] [ [b+n ; b+n + "] to p3 (following the logic of Step 1): If + <  
and " ! 0; it is protable to move all signals x 2 [b n   "; b n ] to b n   " and all
x 2 [b+n ; b+n + "] to b+n + " (following the logic of Step 2): Finally, if + =   for
all " 2 [0; a+n   b+n ]; the same price p3 can be obtained by moving all the mass +
into x+ and all the mass   into x :
Step 4. The argument in Steps 1-3 can be iterated until one obtains a distrib-
ution 0; x 1 ; p4; x
+
1 ; with x
+
1 = 2p4   x 1 and x 1  0 with weights 0; x 1 ; p4 ; x+1 :
Suppose x 1 < x+1 : Then one can increase the price by repeating the argument
in step 1 and moving x 1 and x
+
1 to p4: If 0 = 0; we would end up with a one-
signal distribution. If 0 > 0; we would end up with a two-signals distribution
with signals 0 and p^4: Suppose instead x 1  x+1 : Then one could increase the
price by repeating the argument in step 2 and moving x 1 to 0 and x
+
1 to 2p4:
We would end up with a three-signals distribution with 0; p; 2p: Now consider the










F y(~0)y = (~0 + p)F   (p)F :
We show that there exists a two-signals distribution inducing a larger price. Sup-
pose a mass k4 is moved from p to 0 and a mass k4 is moved from p to 2p: Condition
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y(p   2k4)F y = (~0 + p   k4)F   (p   2k4)F :
That induces a higher price if ~S4 < S4; that is the case if ~S4 decreases in k4 at
k4 = 0: Taking the derivative of ~S4 with respect to k4; we need that
d ~S4
dk4
= (2)1=(F 1)(p   2k4)  (~0 + p   k4) < 0:
Notice that d ~S4=dk4 is decreasing in k4 (1   2 FF 1 < 0 for all F  2); hence if
d ~S4=dk4 < 0 at k4 = 0 then it is negative everywhere. Hence, we need that
(2)1=(F 1)(p)  (~0 + p): (14)
If condition (14) holds, setting k4 = p=2 we obtain a two-signals distribution
which induces a higher price: A similar argument can be applied if condition (14) is
violated by moving a mass ~k4 = min f~0; 2pg from 0 to p and from 2p to p: Hence,
the highest market clearing price is obtained with a two-signals distribution.
Step 5. We are then left with two-signals distributions which take one of
the following forms: a = f0; 1  a; 2pa; ag or b = f0; 1  b; pb; bg or c =
fpc; 1  c; 2pc; cg. For the argument developed in the main text, among those
distributions, the highest price is p; as dened in (7), and it is achieved by ; as
dened in (6). Q. E. D.
Proof of Lemma 2
We show that  and p, as dened respectively in (6) and (7), are part of an
equilibrium. To simplify the notation, denote with h the positive signal which is
in the support of , that is h = '=; where  is dened in (5): First, we show
that there exists a tie-breaking rule such that (; p) clears the market. Suppose
that whenever indi¤erent between buying rm r and selling another rm j the
investor buys r. Then since p = h=2 only those who sample a signal 0 for all
rms sell. The aggregate supply is (1  )F that equals 1=2: As the equilibrium
is symmetric, that implies that the market clears for each rm.
Consider the possibility of deviations and suppose rm j deviates and achieves
a price pj > h=2: Let pr denote the price of non-deviating rm r, with r 6= j.
Step 1. We show that pr  h=2 for all rms r 6= j:
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Pr(jpw   xwj  h  pr);
while the supply for r is at least
Sr  (1  )
Y
w 6=r
Pr(jpw   xwj < pr):
Suppose by contradiction that pr > h=2: Since  < 1    for all F  2 and
Pr(jpw   xwj  h  pr)  Pr(jpw   xwj < pr); there is always excess supply for r:
Hence, we must have pr  h=2 for all r 6= j:
We rst assume that non-deviating rms are traded at the same price, and we
denote this price by p0 (see Step 5 for the case in which non-deviating rms are
traded at di¤erent prices). In what follows, let 1 denote the mass assigned by
j to signals strictly below pj   p0; that is, 1 = Pr(xj < pj   p0): Similarly, let
2 = Pr(p
j + p0  xj < pj + h  p0) and 3 = Pr(xj  pj + h  p0):
Denote by Dj and Sj respectively the demand and supply for the deviating
rm j; and similarly by D j and S j the demand and supply for non-deviating
rms. Investors sell rm j when they sample a signal xj < pj   p0 together with
signals 0 from  j, which occurs with probability (1   )F 1; and they demand
 j whenever a signal h from  j is sampled with a signal xj < pj + h   p0 from
rm j. Hence, we have
Sj +D j  1(1  )F 1 + (1  (1  )F 1)(1  3):
Investors demand j at most when a signal xj 2 [pj; pj + h) is sampled together
with signals 0 from  j or whenever a signal xj  pj+h is sampled with any signal
from  j; and they sell  j whenever they sample signals 0 from rms  j and a
signal xj 2 (pj   p0; pj + p0) from rm j. That is,
Dj + S j  3 + (1  )F 1(1  1   3):
Since market clearing requires Sj +D j = Dj +S j and (1 )F = 1=2; we must
have
1   + 3(1  2): (15)
Step 2. We show that p0 > 0: Suppose by contradiction p0 = 0; then 1+2+3 =
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1 and condition (15) writes as
3  1  2   

2(1  ) : (16)
The average of rm js distribution is at least 2pj + 3(h + pj); which exceeds
2h=2 + 33h=2 since we are assuming pj > h=2: Hence, given that h = ';









Since the left hand side of the above inequality decreases in 2; the condition must
be satised when 2 is the largest, i.e. 2 = 1   (as derived by letting 3 = 0).
The condition writes as 1  < 2; which is violated for all F  2. We conclude
that we cannot have p0 = 0:
Step 3. The aggregate supply of all rms is at least
Sj + S j  (1  2   3)(1  )F 1;
as obtained when a signal 0 from all non-deviating rms is sampled with a signal
xj < pj +p0: Since market clearing requires Sj +S j = 1=2; the previous condition
requires
2 + 3  : (17)
Step 4. The average of rm js distribution is minimized when all signals xj <
pj   p0 are concentrated at xj = 0; all signals xj 2 [pj + p0; pj + h   p0) are
concentrated at xj = pj + p0; all signals xj  pj + h   p0 are concentrated at
xj = pj + h   p0 and all other signals xj 2 [pj   p0; pj + p0) are concentrated at
xj = pj   p0: That is, for condition (2) to hold, we need
2(p
j + p0) + 3(pj + h  p0) + (1  1   2   3)(pj   p0)  ': (18)
Given (15) and (17), the left hand side is minimized when 1 =  + 3(1  2)
and 2 + 3 = : Substituting into (18), we have
(   3)(pj + p0) + 3(pj + h  p0) + (1  3) (1  2) (pj   p0)  ':
The left hand side decreases in p0 and so it is minimized when p0 = h=2. Hence,
pj > h=2 requires h < '; which is violated since by construction h = ': We
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conclude that there is no protable deviation for rm j when non-deviating rms
are traded at the same price p0.
Step 5. Suppose now F > 2 and non-deviating rms are traded at a di¤erent
price. Suppose two non-deviating rms, say rm 1 and rm 2; are traded respec-
tively at prices p1 and p2: Assume wlog that p1 < p2: When signal 0 from rm
1 is drawn together with signal 0 from rm 2 an investor prefers trading stock 2
(since p1 < p2) and when signal 0 from rm 1 is drawn with signal h from rm 2
an investor prefers trading stock 2 (since from Step 1 p1 < h  p2). Hence, S1 = 0
and rm 1 is not traded. We are left with a market in which F 1 rms are traded.
Suppose that, among them, the non-deviating rms are traded at the same price
p. We can repeat the above argument and conclude that there is no protable
deviation. Suppose instead that among the F   1 traded rms there exist two
non-deviating rms which are traded at a di¤erent price. We can repeat the above
argument and end up with F   2 traded rms. Iterating, we end up with 2 traded
rms, in which case we have already shown that there is no protable deviation.
We conclude that the prole (; p) denes an equilibrium. Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose rms choose a distribution with support on [0; 2']; density g sym-
metric around ' and cdf G such that [1   2G(x)]F 1 = 1   x=' for x < ' and
[2G(x)  1]F 1 = x='  1 for x  ':






















g(x)dx = 1 and
2'Z
0
xg(x)dx = ' due to condition (2), we have D = S.
That is, the market clears.
Step 2. There is no protable deviation. To see this, suppose rm j deviates
to a distribution H with density h. Denote with pj the price of j and with p the
price of non-deviating rms. Notice rst that market clearing requires p = '. In
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fact, if p = ' aggregate demand for non-deviating rms is
D j = (F   1)
2'Z
'
g(x)[2G(x)  1]F 2[H(pj + x  ') H('+ pj   x)]dx;
while aggregate supply is
S j = (F   1)
'Z
0
g(x)[1  2G(x)]F 2[H(pj + '  x) H(pj + x  ')]dx:
By symmetry of g; for any x  ' there exists a signal v = 2' x such that g(x) =
g(v). Hence, G(x) = 1 G(v); H(x  ') = H('  v) and H('  x) = H(v   ');
which imply D j = S j for p = ': To see that p = ' is the only market clearing
price for non-deviating rms, suppose p > ': Then the new aggregate demand is
D^ j = (F   1)
2'Z
p
g(x)[G(x) G(2p  x)]F 2[H(pj + x  p) H(p+ pj   x)]dx:
Notice that p > ' implies G(x) G(2p  x) < G(x) G(2'  x) and H(pj + x 
p) H(p+pj x) > H(pj +x ') H('+pj x); so it must be that D^ j < D j:
Similarly, the new aggregate supply is S^ j > S j: Hence, there is excess supply
and so p > ' does not clear the market. The argument which rules out p < ' is





















Since Dj  Sj at pj = '; it must be that pj  ': Hence, there is no protable
deviation. Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose rst that f() is strictly concave in gains from trade. Suppose the
rm chooses the distribution f'  "  ; 1=2  ;'+ "; 1=2 + g ; where " and 
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are positive and  = =(4" + 2) due to condition (2): At p = ', the demand
is (1=2 + )f(") while the supply is (1=2   )f(" + ): Since (1=2 + )=(1=2  
) = ( + ")=" and by concavity of f() that exceeds f(" + )=f("); we have
excess demand at p = ': That is, market clearing requires p > ': If f() is
strictly convex in gains from trade, the same argument applies considering the
distribution f'  "+ ; 1=2 + w;'+ "; 1=2  wg ; where " and  are positive and
w = =(4"  2): Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 8
We show that  and p, as dened respectively in (6) and (7), are part of an
equilibrium. To simplify the notation, denote by h the positive signal which is
in the support of , that is h = '=; where  is dened in (5): Consider the
possibility of deviations and suppose rm j deviates and achieves a price pj > h=2:
Let pr denote the price of non-deviating rm r, with r 6= j.
Step 1. We must have that pr  h=2 for all rms r 6= j: The proof is the same
as in Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 2.
We rst assume that non-deviating rms are traded at the same price, and we
denote this price by p0 (see Step 4 for the case in which non-deviating rms are
traded at di¤erent prices). In what follows, let 3 denote the mass assigned by
j to signals strictly above pj + p0; that is, 3 = Pr(xj > pj + p0) and similarly
2 = Pr(x
j = pj + p0): Denote by Dj and Sj respectively the demand and supply
for the deviating rm j; and similarly by D j and S j the demand and supply for
non-deviating rms.
Step 2. Suppose rst that p0 = h=2: In order to have pj > h=2; there must
be excess net aggregate demand at pj = h=2. In order to show that this is not
possible, we rst dene the maximal net aggregate demand. The aggregate supply
includes at least the draws of a signal 0 from all non-deviating together with a
signal xj < pj + p0 from the deviating rm. That is, we have
Sj + S j  (1  )F 1(1  2   3)f(h
2
): (19)
The aggregate demand includes at most all other cases. Moreover, notice that we
can collapse all signals xj > pj + p0 into their average value x3: That would not
a¤ect the demand of non-deviating rms nor the aggregation constraint (2), and
given the concavity of f() that would not decrease the demand of the deviating
rm. Hence, we have














Substituting (21) into (20), and recalling that (1   )F = 1=2; we have that































1   (1  (


















Dene h(y) = (y)z(1  )  1
2
y +    1
2
and notice that h(1) = 0 and h
0
(y) < 0
when z(1   ) < 1=2 (in fact, h00 (y) < 0 for all z < 1 and h0(1) < 0 when
z(1 ) < 1=2): Hence h(y) < 0 for all y > 1 and that contradicts condition (22).
That is, we cannot have pj > h=2 when p0 = h=2:
Step 3. We now show that decreasing p0 cannot increase pj. Suppose we
decrease p0; say from ~p to ~p   "; and consider the e¤ects on the net demand for
stock j: Denote with 1 the mass of signals at pj  ~p, that is 1 = Pr(xj = pj  ~p):
Investors who sample xj = pj   ~p together with signal 0 from all other rms now
strictly prefer selling rm j. Hence, the supply Sj increases by 1(1 )F 1(1  1F ):
Consider the e¤ects on the demandDj: If j assigns positive mass to xj = h+pj ~p;
investors who sample xj = h+ pj   ~p with a signal h from any other rm  j now
strictly prefer not to buy rm j. That pushes the demand Dj down. If j assigns
positive mass to xj = pj + ~p; investors who sample xj = pj + ~p with signal 0
from all other rms  j now strictly prefer to buy rm j. However, that does not
a¤ect the demand Dj since the tie-breaking rule supporting the equilibrium in
(6) and (7) already assigned all the demand to rm j. Finally, notice that it is
never optimal that j assigns positive mass to signals in (pj; pj + ~p): Those signals
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can be decreased to pj as that would not a¤ect the demand of any rm while
at the same time allowing to increase all the other signals in j and satisfy the
aggregation condition (2). Hence, decreasing p0 involves no change in the demand
due to signals slightly below pj + ~p: Hence, the demand Dj cannot increase as we
decrease p0. It follows that Dj  Sj cannot increase and, given that the price pj is
a smooth function of the net demand Dj   Sj, pj cannot increase as we decrease
p0: That shows that we cannot have pj > h=2 when p0  h=2:
Step 4. Suppose now F > 2 and non-deviating rms are traded at a di¤erent
price. The argument to rule out that this cannot help the deviating rm is the
same as in Step 5 of the proof of Lemma 2. We conclude that the prole (; p)
is part of an equilibrium. Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose that Xj 2 [0; H] and let  = 1   (1=2)1=F : If '=  H, the upper
bound does not bind and the analysis of Proposition 2 applies. Suppose instead
'=(1  )  H: In this case, one can obtain a price p = H with the distribution
 = f0; 1  ;H; g in which ()F  1=2; that is   1 : Since '  (1 )H;
condition (2) is satised. This is obviously the highest price irrespective of F .
Hence, in what follows, we focus on





We rst show that if H  ~H; as dened by condition (10), the highest market
clearing price is achieved with H = f('  H)=(1  ); 1  ;H;g and it is






1   ): (24)
By the same argument a the one developed in Lemma 1, the highest market
clearing price is obtained when the distribution takes one of the following forms.
Either, a = f0; 1  a; pa; ag with (a)F  1=2 and so the highest price is
obtained when a = 1   and it writes as
pa =
'
1   : (25)
The price dened in (24) exceeds pa in (25) if
H  '
1  2 : (26)
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Or b = f0; ~; l; 1  b   ~;H;bg with pb = (H + l)=2 and because of market
clearing
1  (1  ~)F + (1  b   ~)F = 1=2: (27)
Di¤erently from Lemma 1, it may be optimal to have ~ > 0 since shifting signals l
and H further away from the price is not feasible. Since H is obtained as a special
case of b when ~ = 0; we investigate under which condition pb is maximized by

















Di¤erentiating pb with respect to ~; we see that pb decreases in ~ if
2' H  0: (29)
That is, under condition (29), pb is maximized by ~ = 0: Hence, if conditions (26)
and (29) are satised, as required by condition (10) in the text, the highest market
clearing price is dened by (24). This price increases in F since  decreases in F:
We now show that pH can be sustained in equilibrium. The logic follows closely
the proof of Lemma 2. Suppose rm j deviates and achieves a price pj > (H+ l)=2
and let pr denote the price of non-deviating rm r, with r 6= j.
Step 1. Following the same argument as the one in Step 1 of the proof of
Lemma 2, we must have pr  (H + l)=2 for all r 6= j or there would be excess
supply for rm r:
We rst assume that non-deviating rms are traded at the same price, and we
denote it with p0 (see Step 5 for the case in which non-deviating rms are traded
at di¤erent prices). Let 0 = Pr(xj < pj + p
0  H); 1 = Pr(pj + p0  H  xj <
pj   p0 + l); and 2 = Pr(pj + p0   l  xj  H).
Following the logic of Lemma 2, we have that market clearing requires
0 + 1  : (30)
Step 2. We show that p0 > l. Suppose by contradiction that p0 = l; then
0 + 1 + 2 = 1 and (30) writes as
2  1  : (31)
The average of rm js distribution is at least 2pj; and so given (31) and pj >
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(H + l)=2; condition (2) requires
(1  )(H + l) < 2';
that is, H + '  2H < 2'; and that violates (26). We conclude that we cannot
have p = l:
Step 3. Following the logic of Step 3 in the proof of Lemma 2, we need
2   + 0(1  2); (32)
or we would have excess aggregate supply.
Step 4. Condition (2) requires
1(p
j + p
0  H) + 2(pj + p0   l) + (1  0   1   2)(pj   p0 + l)  ': (33)
The previous expression is linear in p
0
; so it must hold either for p
0
= (H + l)=2 or
for p
0 ! l: Suppose p0 = (H + l)=2; we must have 2H + (1 0 2)l < '; which
given (30) and (32) must hold when 0 =  1 and 2 = +( 1)(1 2):
That is, we need (   1) (H   2l   2H + 2l) < 0; which is equivalent to
H < 2'; and that violates condition (29). Suppose instead p
0 ! l; (33) requires
(1   0   1)(H + l) < 2'; which given (30) requires (1   )(H + l) < 2': As
shown in Step 2, this violates (26).
Step 5. The argument to show that there are no protable deviations when
some non-deviating rms are traded at a di¤erent price follows Step 5 of the proof
of Lemma 2. Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose rm j has fundamental 'j = ' + "j, j = f"j; 1  ; 2p + "j; g
and prices are pj = p+"j. The logic to show that the market clears is the same as
in Lemma 2. Let h = '=; where  = 1  (1=2)1=F ; and suppose rm j deviates
and achieves a price pj > h=2 + "j: Let pr denote the price of non-deviating rm
r, with r 6= j.
Step 1. Following the argument of Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 2, we
establish that pr  h=2 + "r for all r 6= j as otherwise there would be excess
supply for rm r:
Assume rst that the price of the non-deviating rms takes the following form:
pr = "r + h for all r 6= j;
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where, due to Step 1,   1=2: In Step 5, we consider the general case in which
pr = "r+rh: Let 0 = Pr(xj < pj (1 )h); 1 = Pr(pj (1 )h  xj < pj h);
2 = Pr(p
j + h  xj < pj + (1  )h); and 3 = Pr(xj  pj + (1  )h):
Following the logic of Lemma 2, we have that market clearing requires
0 + 1   + 3(1  2): (34)
Step 2. We show that  > 0 when F > 2:
Suppose by contradiction that  = 0 and so 0 +1 +2 +3 = 1: Hence, (34)
writes as
3  1  2   

2(1  ) : (35)
The average of rm js distribution is at least 1(pj   h) + 2pj + 3(h + pj);
which exceeds 1("j   h=2) + 2(h=2 + "j) + 3(3h=2 + "j) since we are assuming




+ "j) + (




+ "j) < '+ "j: (36)
Since the left hand side of the above inequality decreases in 2; it must be satised
when 2 is the largest. Substituting 2 = 1   and ' = h into (36), we have
h (1  3) < 2"j; which is violated for all F > 2. A similar argument applies
when "j  h=2 by noticing that the average of rm js distribution is minimized
when 2 = 1    and so in particular we must have (1   )h=2 < (h + "j):
Given (12), that requires (1  )h=2 < (h + (1  2)h), which is violated for
any F > 2. We conclude that we cannot have  = 0 when F > 2:
Step 3. Suppose  > 0. The aggregate supply of all rms is at least
Sj + S j  0 + (1  2   3   0)(1  )F 1;
as obtained when a signal xj < pj   (1   )h from rm j is sampled with any
other signal from rms  j and when a signal "r from all rms r 6= j is sampled
with a signal xj < pj + h from rm j. Hence, market clearing requires
2 + 3   + 0(1  2): (37)
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Step 4. Condition (2) requires
1(p
j   (1  )h) + 2(pj + h) + 3(pj + (1  )h)+
(1  0   1   2   3)(pj   h)  '+ "j: (38)
Suppose rst F > 2 and so  > 0. Given (34) and (37), the left hand side is
minimized when 1 =  + 3(1   2)   0 and 2 =  + 0(1   2)   3:
Substituting into (38), we see that the left hand side of (38) decreases in  and so
it must hold when  = 1=2. This in turn requires "j > (1  2)h; which violates
condition (12) in the text.
Suppose nally that F = 2: The left hand side of inequality (38) is linear in
; so it must hold either for  = 1=2 or for  = 0: If  = 1=2; we can repeat
the argument above and conclude that "j > (1   2)h violates condition (12)
in the text (notice that 2(p   ') = 'p2 when F = 2 and so "j  'p2=2
implies "j  2(p ')). Suppose then  = 0: Condition (38) requires in particular
2p
j + 3(p
j + h)  '+ "j; which given (35) requires
2p
j +
1  2   
2(1  ) (p
j + h)  '+ "j:
The left hand side is linear in 2 and so it must hold when either 2 = 0 or
2 = 1   : Suppose 2 = 0; we have pj  2"j   (1   2)h; that implies pj <
h=2 + "j since by condition (12) "j  'p2=2 . Suppose then 2 = 1 ; we have
pj  ('+"j)=(1 ): Condition (12) is equivalent to ('+"j)=(1 )  h=2+"j.
We conclude that there is no protable deviation for rm j when non-deviating
rms are traded at prices pr = "r + h.
Step 5. Suppose each non-deviating rm is traded at a price pr = "r + rh:
The argument to show that there are no protable deviations follows Step 5 of the
proof of Lemma 2. Q. E. D.
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